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Abstract
Emerging economies tend to experience larger ﬂuctuations in their terms of trade, coun-
tercyclical interest rates and more default episodes than developed countries. These struc-
tural features might suggest a relevant role for world prices in driving country spreads. This
paper studies the role of terms of trade shocks in inducing output ﬂuctuations and coun-
tercyclical spreads using a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open
economy. The model predicts that default incentives and default premia are higher in reces-
sions, as observed in the data. In a quantitative exercise, the model matches various features
of emerging economies and can account for the dynamics of default episodes in these mar-
kets.
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Resumen
Las econom´ ıas emergentes tienden a experimentar mayores ﬂuctuaciones en sus t´ ermi-
nos de intercambio y m´ as episodios de default soberano que los pa´ ıses desarrollados. Estas
caracter´ ısticas estructurales sugieren un papel relevante para los choques externos en la ge-
neraci´ on de ﬂuctuaciones econ´ omicas y spreads. Este art´ ıculo estudia el papel de choques
en los t´ erminos de intercambio sobre los incentivos a hacer default y las primas de riesgo,
usando un modelo de equilibrio general para una econom´ ıa peque˜ na y abierta. El modelo
predice que los incentivos a no pagar la deuda son mayores en recesiones, como se observa en
los datos. En el an´ alisis cuantitativo, el modelo replica varias caracter´ ısticas de las econom´ ıas
emergentes.
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Small open emerging market economies diﬀer from developed economies in diﬀerent
aspects: developing countries typically face large swings in the price of the goods they
export. These countries rely heavily on a narrow range of primary commodities for their
export earnings, and are highly dependent on imported capital goods and intermediate
inputs for domestic production. They also have more volatile business cycles, and are
more crisis prone than developed countries. In the last two decades, emerging mar-
kets have experienced several cases of sovereign default, some of the most recent being
Ecuador in 1999 and Argentina in 2001 among others. Additionally, these economies
have countercyclical interest rates, which are in general related to countercyclical de-
fault risk. These structural features suggest that ﬂuctuations in world prices may play
as i g n i ﬁcant role on business cycle ﬂuctuations and country interest rate spreads in
developing economies.
The objective of this paper is to examine how the level and volatility of terms of trade
aﬀect incentives to default and thus, equilibrium interest rates in developing countries
using a stochastic dynamic model of a small open economy with endogenous default risk.
The economy produces an exportable good using labor and foreign inputs. Households
value leisure and consume foreign and domestic goods and the domestic government
has access to international ﬁnancial markets, where it can borrow or lend to foreign
lenders. Markets are incomplete because the government buys and sells one period non
contingent discount bond and it cannot commit to repay its sovereign debt.
In a quantitative analysis, the model is calibrated to emerging economies. The paper
shows that terms of trade have signiﬁcant eﬀects on country spreads through theirimpact on output and household consumption. The model generates countercyclical
spreads as observed in data, explains a portion of the interest rate spread level and
volatility and mimics the negative correlation between GDP and spreads to a signiﬁcant
extent. Results match the empirical data in that default incentives are higher when the
economy is in recession, has large debt positions and terms of trade are relatively low.
In addition, a more volatile output is associated with higher default probabilities and
interest rate spreads.
The production technology in the paper allows one to explore the role of input
shares for quantiﬁying country spreads in these economies. The model provides guidance
on how would changes in the production structure of these economies impact on the
countries’ risk of default, and thus, on spreads. In particular, it is observed that a higher
dependence of the productive sector on foreign inputs may lead to higher country interest
rate spreads and lower debt levels.
In a similar way, by analyzing changes in the consumption structure between im-
portables and exportables, the model shows that for any given level of output ﬂuctu-
ations, the higher the weight of imported goods in the household consumption basket,
the higher and more volatile will be the spreads and the lower will be the sustainable
debt level.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the link to the literature; the eco-
nomic environment and the theoretical model are presented in Section 3, the equilibrium
is characterized in Section 4, the quantitative implications of the model are analyzed in
Section 5 and the conclusions are presented in Section 6. The algorithm is described in
the appendix.2. Link to the Literature
During the 1970s international lending took mostly the form of bank lending. The de-
faults of the 1980s prompted the international capital markets to partly switch from bank
loans to bonds. In the 1990s, international bond issues by emerging market economies
have surged dramatically and became one of the fastest growing devices of external de-
velopment ﬁnance. An increasing number of emerging economies currently borrow from
the international capital market by issuing bonds. Latin America accounted for the
largest share of emerging market tradable debt throughout the decade. Bond ﬁnancing
became the second major source of funding in that region, where Cline (1995) docu-
ments that bond issues grew from less than 1 billion US$ in 1989 to 11.17 billion US$
in 1993. At the end of 1999, Latin America’s tradable sovereign external debt stood
beyond US$ 200 billion. (CEPAL 2000).
Interest rate spreads ( the diﬀerences between yields on sovereign bonds of emerging
market economies and U.S. treasury securities of comparable maturities ) on bonds
issued by Latin American countries ﬂuctuated signiﬁcantly during the decade and were
subject to abrupt changes in moments of crisis. In fact, the change in composition of
international capital lending has been accompanied by the occurrence of sudden reversals
of capital ﬂows and defaults like the Ecuadorian crisis of 1999 and the Argentinian crisis
of 2001. Therefore, in order to assess the role of bonds as a source of external ﬁnance
in emerging markets, it is important to understand the behavior and evolution of bond
spreads in a framework that explicitly considers the link between bond value and risk
of default, and the determinants of this risk.
There is an extensive debate about the determinants of pricing and thus the yieldspreads of emerging market bond issues: while some subscribe to the view that spreads
are driven by improvements in economic fundamentals, others attribute the changes
in spreads to global factors such as international interest rates and market sentiment.
The identiﬁcation of the sources of income and country spread volatility is very relevant
from an analytical as well as from a policy perspective, since it helps policy makers
to address them. A number of studies have addressed this issue: several studies ﬁnd
that macroeconomic variables such as GDP growth and external debt to GDP ratios
are important determinants of country spreads.1 Min (1998) and Min , et. al. (2003)
ﬁnd that improved terms of trade are associated with lower yield spreads, since an
improvement in the terms of trade implies an increase in exports earnings and better
repayment capacity, which reduce the yield spread.
Terms of trade and commodity price volatility are an important factor in driving
business cycle ﬂuctuations and a potentially relevant source of interest rate spreads in
emerging economies. These economies have more volatile business cycles than devel-
oped countries since their economies tend to be less diversiﬁed: GDP and government
revenues sometimes depend excessively on one or two economic sectors or commodities.
According to UNCTAD, in 1995, 57 developing countries depended on three commodi-
ties for more than half of their exports. The notorious volatility of commodity prices
creates instability and uncertainty for commodity-dependent developing countries, un-
dermining economic growth and aﬀecting governments, consumers and producers.2
The literature on small open economies recognizes the terms of trade shocks as one
of the most relevant shocks aﬀecting these economies. Mendoza (1995) was the ﬁrst to
analyze the quantitative importance of terms of trade shocks in driving business cycles
1Goldman Sachs (2000) among others
2World Bank Premnote No.13using a dynamic stochastic small open economy model. His work focuses on aggregate
output ﬂuctuations and he ﬁnds that terms of trade disturbances explain 56% of output
in developing countries. Kose (2002) studies the role of world price shocks - ﬂuctuations
in the prices of capital, intermediate and primary goods, and in the world interest rate -
in the generation and propagation of business cycles in small open developing countries.
He ﬁnds that world price shocks play an important role in driving business cycles in
small open emerging economies: roughly 88 percent of aggregate output ﬂuctuations
can be explained by these shocks.
Figures 1 to 4 in appendix illustrate the correlations between terms of trade ﬂuc-
tuations, interest rates spreads and GDP movements for Ecuador, the ﬁrst country
to default on Brady bonds, and Venezuela3. Before dollarizing the economy in Janu-
ary 2000, in 1999 Ecuador defaulted on its debt after a signiﬁcant deterioration of the
macroeconomic conditions. Prior to the crisis, the country experimented a signiﬁcant
deterioration of its terms of trade. Falling oil and primary commodity prices and a
low nonoil tax base played a crucial role, which indicates the relevance of commodity
price shocks.4 Ecuador and Venezuela, and specially their exports are highly dependent
on a few commodities.5 Moreover, as ﬁgures 1 and 2 show, there is a strong positive
correlation between one year lagged terms of trade movements and GDP ﬂuctuations.
This evidence is consistent with the ﬁndings in Broda (2003) who observes that terms of
trade shocks are a substantial source of economic ﬂuctuations and can seriously disrupt
output growth in developing economies, specially in countries with ﬁxed exchange rate
3GDP and TOT are in logs and all variables are detrended with a H-P ﬁlter.
4World Bank Report on Ecuador (May 2003) and S. Fischer, IMF (2000)
5Oil and bananas together accounted for 59 percent of Ecuadorian exports in 2001. Oil represented
70 percent of the exports of Venezuela in 1998.regimes, and with the empirical study for Argentina and Ecuador in Broda and Tille
(2003).
Recent empirical studies by Caballero (2003), Caballero and Panageas (2003) and
by Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) also ﬁnd that a fall in commodity prices increases
the likelihood of a Sudden Stop in capital ﬂows, an event which is accompanied by large
interest rate upswings. They point out the recent episode of the Russian crises of August
1998, in which emerging market economies such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Korea and Peru all suﬀered from sudden stops in capital ﬂows and an increase in country
risk premia. Table 1 and ﬁgure 5 show a strong positive comovement in terms of trade
for many latin american countries over the last decade. This may suggest that terms of
trade movements in the region might play a role in explaining the positive comovement
of interest rate spreads, a feature claimed in some of these empirical studies.
The fact that sovereign spreads are higher in recessions indicates that business cycles
in emerging market economies are negatively correlated with the interest rates that
these economies face in international credit markets. In recent studies with data for
diﬀerent emerging economies, Neumeyer and Perri (2001) and Uribe and Yue (2004)
have documented that the cost of foreign credit is higher in recessions than in booms.
Emerging economies also present more volatile interest rates than developed countries.
The countercyclical behavior of interest rates and their higher volatility are closely linked
to the default probabilities that foreign lenders perceive from these economies. Empirical
studies have estimated these probabilities, ﬁnding that the incentives to default are
higher in recessions.6 Therefore, we can consider that in a recession, an emerging
6See Marcel Peter (2002) for a survey on econometric studies of the probability of sovereign default
in emerging markets.economy faces higher interest rates precisely because in that phase of the cycle foreign
lenders perceive higher default probabilities and thus require higher risk premia.
In addition, Cantor and Packer (1996) have found that higher sovereign credit ratings
are associated to lower interest rates. They have also observed that these ratings,
which are valuations on the probability that a borrower will not pay back its debts,
strongly respond to macroeconomic factors, such as the GDP growth rate and per capita
income. These facts also suggest that the countercyclical behavior of sovereign default
risk may explain the countercyclicality of interest rates. Therefore, the probability of
no repayment that is perceived by international creditors may be playing a relevant
role in explaining the behavior of interest rates faced by emerging market economies.
Figures 3 and 4 show the counter-cyclicality of interest rates spreads for Ecuador and
Venezuela. This evidence suggests that the analysis of international credit markets and
the joint study of default risk, interest rates and external price shocks are a relevant
research topic for emerging market macroeconomics.
In standard general equilibrium models for small open economies, Mendoza (1991),
it is assumed that there is perfect access to international credit markets, so the countries
will borrow at a given international risk free rate up to the amount that their wealth
allows them to. These countries participate in international credit markets in order to
smooth their consumption and insure themselves against adverse shocks, facing no re-
striction in accessing the international credit markets. Because the international interest
rate is exogenous, that is, it is not determined within the model, these models cannot
explain the behavior of the interest rates that are faced by emerging market economies:
interest rates do not depend on the domestic decisions taken by these economies.
With the objective of generating endogenous interest rates that vary with the busi-ness cycle, this paper introduces a credit friction in a stochastic dynamic model for
a small open economy. The friction arises because the government has the option of
defaulting on its foreign debt. Thus, the interest rate faced by the country results from
the interaction between the government and the foreign creditors.
This paper considers a credit friction based on the willingness to pay of the borrower,
who will optimally decide to default on her debt when the expected discounted value of
defaulting exceeds the expected discounted value of repaying. Arellano and Mendoza
(2002) discuss how this credit friction can be used to explain emerging markets features.
The willingness to pay models were originated in the pioneering work of Eaton and
Gerzovitz (1981) and using this approach, Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios Rull
(2002) develop a quantitative model of unsecured consumer credit with the risk of default
where they model equilibrium default in an incomplete markets setting.
This paper extends the approach developed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) in their
seminal research on international lending by analyzing the relationship between terms of
trade ﬂuctuations and endogenous default probabilities in a production economy. The
model considers a default penalty that is limited to temporary ﬁnancial autarky and
introduces a production technology. The model is applied in a quantitative exercise to
a set of emerging market economies.
The model in this paper is specially related to Arellano (2003), who develops a
quantitative model based on the willingness to pay approach in order to study output,
real exchange rates and country spreads in emerging markets. Her analysis, however,
does not consider a production economy or intermediate foreign inputs and does not
address the issue of terms of trade ﬂuctuations. Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) analyze the
eﬀect of stochastic productivity trends to improve the empirical predictions of the modelon the countercyclicality of the current account. Yue(2004) develops a quantitative small
open economy model to study sovereign default considering a debt renegotiation process.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft e r m so ft r a d ei nas t o c h a stic general equilibrium model of a small
open economy is highlighted by Mendoza (1995) but he does not model endogenous
equilibrium default. Kose (2002), Broda (2003) and Broda and Tille (2003) also study
the importance of terms of trade and economic ﬂuctuations using various approaches
but their models do not account either for endogenous default risk premia or interest
rate spreads.
3. The Model
Consider a standard neoclassical small open economy model with four agents, house-
holds, ﬁrms, government and foreign lenders, where the only asset traded in international
ﬁnancial markets is a one period non contingent real discount bond that is available to
the government7. Debt contracts are not enforceable as the government has the option
to default on them. When it defaults, it is temporarily cut oﬀ from credit markets. For-
eign lenders charge a premium to account for the probability of not being paid back by
the government. Households consume exportable and importable goods and leisure, and
the government smooths their consumption path through lump sum transfers. Firms
produce tradable goods using labor and foreign inputs.
The model economy in the paper is subject to terms of trade shocks Pt with a
stationary and monotone Markov transition function. Let Qsit(Pt+1|Pt) denote the
Markov transition function for P.
7Most external debt in developing countries represents government debt. For example in Argentina
and Ecuador, government debt accounts for almost 70% of the total stock of foreign debt.3.1. Households
There is a representative agent with preferences given by the present value of the sum







βtu(C(xt,m t,l t)) (3.1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Households derive utility from the consumption
of goods and leisure. Let Ct be a composite good that aggregates household consumption
of importables, exportables and leisure. Thus, xt represents the domestic consumption
of the exportable good produced in this economy and mt represents the amount of
the importable good . The amount of labor is denoted by lt. The period utility func-














is a composite good with a Cobb Douglas aggregation function on household consump-
tion of importables and exportables.
The representative consumer receives labor income and a lump sum transfer from
the government, so she maximizes 3.1 subject to the budget constraint
Pxt + mt = wtlt + Ttwhere Pt is the relative price of exportables with respect to importables, the terms
of trade faced by the economy. Terms of trade are exogenous because the economy is
small in international goods markets. wt represents the wage, and Tt reﬂects a lump sum
transfer in units of importables that the government gives to the household to smooth
her consumption path. A positive Tt is thus a subsidy and a negative value represents
a tax. This transfer is chosen by the government, so it is exogenous for individual
consumers. Given the nature of the representative household’s budget constraint, she
faces a static optimization problem.
3.2. Firms
Firms are identical, perfectly competitive in input and ﬁnal goods markets and produce
domestic goods using labour L and a foreign input Z. They produce using a CES
technology. Firms hire labor and buy an intermediate foreign good to produce an
exportable ﬁnal good.
The problem of the representative ﬁr mc a nb ee x p r e s s e da sf o l l o w s :
max
{Lt,Zt}
PtF(Lt,Z t) − [wtLt + Zt] (3.2)
where F(·) is strictly increasing in each argument and homogeneous of degree one,
Lt and Zt denote respectively the amount of labor and imported intermediate good.
While countries are in temporary ﬁnancial autarky after a default episode, Puhan and
Sturzenegger (2003) estimate an average fall in output of 2 % that may be reﬂecting
cuts in foreign aid and trade disruptions and Rose (2003) ﬁnds an 8% decline in bilateral
trade. The output loss in autarky is captured in the model as an exogenous fall in the
productivity of ﬁrms, APtF(Lt,Z t) where 0 <A<1.3.3. Government
There is a benevolent government in that its objective is to maximize the utility of
the households in the economy. The government has access to international ﬁnancial
markets where it can lend and borrow. Credit markets are incomplete because the
government can only save and indebt itself issuing and buying non contingent one period
bonds. The government uses international borrowing to give a lump sum transfer T to
the households (if T<0 it is a tax). Each period, the government can choose between
paying its debt or defaulting on it. This decision results from comparing the net beneﬁts
of the two alternatives, that is, by optimally balancing the cost of exclusion given by
the foregone beneﬁts of consumption smoothing, against the direct costs of repayment
given by the short-run disutility of repaying the loan. Since the government faces
an intertemporal problem, it is expressed in a recursive dynamic programming form.
Conditional on having access to international credit markets, the government has to
decide whether to default, the amount of transfers and how much borrowing or saving
to do each period given the exogenous shocks and the amount of outstanding assets or
liabilities it has. Therefore, the state variables for the government are Bt,d t and Pt,
where dt =1if the economy has access to credit markets and 0 otherwise.
The value function of the government who has access to credit markets and begins
the period with an amount of foreign assets B and shock P is V0(B,P). The government
must decide whether to default or not by comparing the value of paying its debt and
remaining in the credit market V c(B,P), with the value of defaulting and living in
temporary autarky V d(P). The decision problem can be expressed as follows:





1 if V c(B,P) >Vd(P)
0 otherwise
which indicates that the government optimally defaults whenever the discounted value
of choosing to default is equal or higher than the continuation value. The government
default policies determine a repayment set Γ(B) deﬁned as the set of values of the
exogenous shocks such that repayment is optimal given asset holding level B,
Γ(B)={P ∈ Υ : D(B,P)=1 }
and a default set z(B) deﬁned as the set of values of the exogenous shocks such that
default is optimal given asset holding level B,
z(B)={P ∈ Υ : D(B,P)=0 }
When the government decides to pay, it can issue new debt and give a transfer to
the households according to the following restriction:
T = B − q(B0,P)B0
A negative value of B implies that the government has foreign debt. q(B0,P) is the
price of the bond that pays one unit of importables next period if the government does
not default. When the government borrows, it sells bonds in the international credit
market, and when it lends, it buys bonds from foreign creditors. A sell of B0 in bonds -
a negative value of B0- implies that the government receives q(B0,P)B0 units of period
t importable good from foreign creditors on the current period and promises to pay B0
units of the good next period conditional on not defaulting.In the same way, a purchase of bonds of value B0 implies that the government lends
q(B0,P)B0 units of period t importable good to foreign creditors and it will receive B0
units next period. It is assumed that foreign creditors always pay their debts, so the only
agent who may decide not to commit to repay is the domestic government. When the
government borrows, the price of the bond reﬂects the possibility that the government
defaults, so this price should depend on B0 (the amount that is borrowed) and on P
(since today’s shock aﬀects the probability distribution for next period’s shock) because
the incentives to default depend on both factors.
Therefore, the government problem when it participates in international credit mar-
kets can be expressed as follows:
V c(B,P)=m a x









The ﬁrst restriction is the one already described. The last three equations reﬂect the
fact that the government makes its decisions subject to the private sector optimizing as
well. X, M and L represents the optimal consumption and labor decision rules when
the country has access to credit markets d=1. Note that households optimize taking as
given the government transfer T.
When the government decides not to pay its sovereign debt the country loses accessto international credit markets for a stochastic number of periods, so the country is
temporarily in ﬁnancial autarky, without being able to save or borrow. Therefore, the
problem when the country is in autarky is as follows:
V d(P)=u(Cd (Xd,M d,L d)) + β
X
P0






which shows that the government has no instruments now to smooth household con-
sumption. Xd, Md and Ld represents the optimal consumption and labor decision rules
when the country is in autarky d=0. The probability of reentering ﬁnancial markets
next period is denoted µ. When the economy returns to ﬁnancial markets, it does so
with no debt burden, B =0 .
3.4. Foreign Creditors
T h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e ro fi d e n t i c a l ,i n ﬁnitely lived foreign lenders. Each lender can bor-
row or lend resources at the risk free rate rf and participates in a perfectly competitive
market to the small open economy.
The individual lender is risk neutral and maximizes expected proﬁts, which are given
by the following equation






B0As it was pointed out by Cole and Kehoe (1996), the assumption of risk neutrality of
lenders captures the idea that the analysis considers that compared to international
credit markets, the domestic economy is small.
The ﬁrst term of the equation above shows that when creditors lend to the gov-
ernment in the current period, they buy the discount bond issued by the domestic
government at a price q. Next period the lenders may receive the face value of the bond
depending on whether the government defaults or not. When it defaults, creditors get
0 units of the importable good. λ(B0,P) is the endogenous probability that the gov-
ernment defaults on its sovereign debt. Therefore, with probability 1−λ(B0,P) lenders
will be paid back an amount B0
Since there is perfect competition in the credit market, a zero proﬁt condition for





where λ(B0,P) is the endogenous probability that the domestic government will
default on its sovereign debt. Thus, the equilibrium bond price q(B0,P) reﬂects the





so that the default probability is zero when z(B0)=∅ and it is one when z(B0)=Υ.
4. Equilibrium
In equilibrium households choose optimal consumption of importables and exportables
given prices and government transfers, ﬁrms optimize given prices and the government
determines its optimal default policy and its optimal asset holding policy subject to theprivate sector optimizing and foreign lenders optimizing by satisfying their zero proﬁt
condition from the debt contract.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A recursive equilibrium for this small open economy is characterized
by
i. a set of value functions V0,Vc and V d for the government,
ii. a set of policy functions for household’s consumption of exportables X,
Xd importables M, Md and labor supply l, ld,
iii. policy functions for the ﬁrm’s demand for foreign inputs Z,Zd and for labor
L,Ld,
iv. policy functions for government’s default decision D, optimal asset holdings B0
and transfers T, Td,
v. wage functions w, wd
vi. a bond price function q
such that
1. The wage function is such that the labor market clears, L = l when the country
is in trade and Ld = ld when the country is in autarky.
2. Given the wage function, the policy functions for the ﬁrm solve 3.2:
{Z,L} ∈ arg max
{L,Z}
PF(L,Z) − [wL+ Z]
3. Given the government policies, the bond price function and the wage function,
the household policies for consumption and labor solve the household’s problem 3.1.
4. Given the bond price function q and the optimal policies for ﬁrms and households,
the government’s value functions V0,Vc and V d and its policy functions D, B0 and T
solve 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5:5. The equilibrium bond price q(B0,s) is such that all agents in the small open
economy are optimizing and international lenders get zero expected proﬁts, satisfying
credit market clearing condition
4.1. Characterization of the Equilibrium
Proposition 1 For any given realization of the exogenous shock P, default incentives
are stronger the higher the level of foreign debt.
Proof. See Appendix.
The logic is similar to Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). If default is optimal for some
l e v e lo fa s s e t sB for a given terms of trade shock P, the value of staying in the contract
is lower than the value of default. Since the value of default is independent of B and
the value of the contract monotonically increases in the amount of assets B,t h e r ee x i s t s
as u ﬃciently negative level of assets B for which the economy optimally defaults for all
realizations of the terms of trade shocks. As assets increase, the default set shrinks. At
as u ﬃciently high level of assets B ≤ 0 the economy never defaults.
This proposition shows how the bond price schedule depends on the amount of assets
and shock realizations. For B ≥ B and any realization of the shock, default is not an
outcome, so the bond pays the risk free rate. Since default sets shrink in assets, as the
economy decreases its level of assets B0such that B <B 0 < B, default probabilities
increase and the equilibrium bond price function q(B0,P) declines in B0. Therefore, the
larger the amount of debt, the higher the default probability and the lower the bond
price. When B0 ≤ B default is optimal for any realization of the shocks, which implies
that the probability of default is one and thus the bond price is zero.
Figure 7 shows the default region for the calibrated economy, i.e., the combinationsof terms of trade and foreign debt levels for which default is optimal. Given a terms of
trade shock, if default is optimal for a certain debt level, it will be optimal for all higher
levels of the ratio, illustrating the result of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 For any given level of foreign debt, without government intervention
a lower realization of the exogenous shock P reduces household welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
An adverse terms of trade shocks has two eﬀects on the economy: on the production
side, as the relative price of output with respect to factor prices declines, the economy
ﬁnds it more costly to produce the ﬁnal exportable good, so the demand for labor and
the foreign input falls. The decrease in the use of the foreign input lowers the marginal
product of labor, thus decreasing further the demand for this factor and decreasing
wages. Then, household income falls both because the economy produces a smaller
amount of exportables and because the value of those produced goods can be exchanged
for a reduced amount of imported goods. On the consumption side, adverse terms of
trade change the relative price of the components of the consumption basket, making
importables more expensive, which tends to reduce the consumption of importables.
At the same time, the substitution eﬀect tends to increase consumption of exportables.
However, given that both importables and exportables are normal goods , the fall in
income tends to reduce the consumption of both goods. Since the latter eﬀect is stronger,
consumption of both goods falls. The decline in labor implies a higher amount of leisure
which increases welfare, but it also implies a lower household income that tends to reduce
consumption of goods which more than oﬀsets the leisure eﬀect. The overall net eﬀect
is a fall in consumption of the composite good and therefore in household welfare.
The following propositions are derived for the case of i.i.d. shocks, permanent au-tarky and no output loss in autarky, but they are also satisﬁed in the speciﬁcation for
the quantitative analysis.
Proposition 3 For any given level of foreign debt, default incentives are stronger
the lower the realization of the exogenous shock P.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 2, an adverse terms of trade shock would reduce house-
hold’s welfare, providing an incentive to the benevolent government in the economy to
implement a positive transfer. However, if the government is a net debtor it would
have to borrow in order to obtain resources for both paying back its foreign debt and
g i v i n gat r a n s f e rt oc o n s u m e r s ,n e c e s s a r i l yincreasing foreign debt. After a sequence
of bad terms of trade shocks the government could end up highly indebted. Under
this circumstance, there would not be ﬁnancial contracts available to the government
that allowed it to give a positive transfer, so instead of implementing a transfer the
government would have to tax households to pay back its debt. This would imply a
lower level of welfare for consumers and since utility is concave and increasing in the
composite good, the reduction in welfare would be more costly the lower the terms of
trade. Therefore, if the government is already highly indebted and the country faces
a negative shock, the bond is not a very useful insurance instrument because with a
low terms of trade shock the economy would like to borrow but it cannot raise enough
resources to smooth consumption. Then, the asset is not very valuable for the economy
and default may be the optimal choice in a state where the shock is low and defaulting
could be the optimal decision. Then, given a foreign debt level, the worse the terms of
trade shock the higher the incentives to default.
As it can be seen in Figure 1 for the calibrated economy, given a debt level, if defaultis optimal for a certain terms of trade shock, it will be optimal for all lower values of
the shock, implying that default incentives are stronger the lower the realization of the
shock.
Proposition 4 Asset decisions are increasing in terms of trade. The government
borrows more in recessions than in booms. Given a current level of foreign assets B,
conditional on not defaulting, for all P1 <P 2, if B0
1 = B0 (B,P1) and B0





Since the government is benevolent, it maximizes consumer lifetime utility, which
implies smoothing households’s consumption. In order to do that, the government
borrows and implements a positive transfer in bad times and taxes households and saves
in good times. The government lends and borrows by issuing and buying non contingent
bonds respectively. Since the government cannot commit to pay its foreign debt, when
borrowing it faces an interest rate that may be higher than the risk free international
interest rate. This risk premia is increasing in foreign debt because the incentives to
default are higher when the government is highly indebted. Therefore, the bond price
is increasing in foreign assets. On the other hand, when terms of trade shocks are i.i.d.,
bond prices do not depend on the current realization of terms of trade, because the
probability of having an adverse shock tomorrow does not depend on the current level
of the shock. Thus the government faces the same bond price schedule in all states of the
world. The ﬁnancial contracts available to the government are the same for all possible
realizations of terms of trade. Now suppose that the government borrows more and gives
a higher transfer to consumers in booms than in recessions: that would make household
consumption even more volatile. Instead of smoothing consumption, the governmentwould be doing the opposite. Since the contracts available to the government in good
times are also available in bad times, the government could switch assets decisions
and in this way smooth households consumption, which would be welfare enhancing
for consumers, because they prefer a smooth path of consumption over a volatile one.
Therefore, given the contracts available to the government, borrowing more in economic
expansions would not be an optimal decision.
Proposition 5 Interest rates cannot be procyclical. Given a current level of foreign
assets B,f o ra l lP1 <P 2, if B0
1 = B0 (B,P1) and B0




Governments borrow more in bad times at higher interest rates. When the country
is hit by an adverse shock, the government issues bonds and transfers resources to
consumers in order to avoid a fall in households welfare. Higher borrowing implies
higher risk premium, because default incentives are stronger the higher the level of debt.
Since adverse terms of trade realizations reduce domestic output, the government would
be borrowing more in recessions and paying higher interest rates. Given i.i.d. terms of
trade shocks, the government faces the same bond price schedule in good and bad times.
The bond price is decreasing in foreign debt because risk premium is increasing in the
probability of default, hence higher borrowing implies a movement along a unique and
decreasing bond price schedule. Thus, interest rates are countercyclical.
4.2. Euler Equation
The Euler equation for the government is obtained from the ﬁrst order condition of its

































The Euler equation is interpreted in terms of marginal beneﬁts and marginal cost of
additional lending or borrowing. First, consider the case where the government is a net
creditor. Note that lending implies buying foreign bonds, so additional lending would
imply additional bond purchases: the government would tax households and use the
proceeds to ﬁnance these additional foreign bonds purchases. Since the country is small
in international credit markets, all external prices including the world interest rate are
given, so the government can not inﬂuence credit markets and additional lending would
not aﬀect the international risk free rate
∂q
∂B0 =0 . Thus, the price of the bonds bought
by the government is simply the inverse of the risk rate q = 1
1+rf , so that for each unit
of additional lending the government increases taxes and reduces current households’s
expenditure in q units. In the next period, the government would receive one unit of
foreign goods, which will be given to households as a lump sum transfer.
The marginal beneﬁts and costs can be described as follows:
In terms of eﬀects on today’s utility, a marginal increase in current lending aﬀects
consumption of both goods. The government increases taxes and reduces consumer’s
disposable income in q units. Since both goods are normal, households end up consuming
less of both exportable and importable goods, which would reduce today’s welfare. On
the other hand, the following period the government will get one unit of foreign goods
for each unit of additional lending. These resources will be given to households as a
lump sum transfer, thus future disposable income goes up, which allows households to
consume more goods, increasing tomorrow’s welfare.Now consider the more interesting case where the government is a net debtor. Bor-
rowing from international capital markets implies issuing bonds and transferring re-
sources to consumers. Additional borrowing would aﬀect government’s transfers to
households. Since the government is borrowing more it could give a higher transfer
but at the same time if the government is already indebted additional borrowing would
increase the interest rate that it faces in international markets. As it was explained
before, default probabilities are increasing in foreign debt, so if the government wants
to borrow more, foreign lenders would require a higher risk premium. The decrease
in the bond price implies that the government is not getting as many resources from
selling bonds as it would get if the bond price were constant. Therefore, when eval-
uating the beneﬁts and costs of additional external borrowing, the government takes
into account the fact that issuing more bonds would decrease the price. Although the
country is small, the government’s borrowing can aﬀect the idiosyncratic bond price
that it faces: if the government issues additional bonds, default probabilities will be
higher and foreign creditors will demand a lower price, otherwise they will not buy the
bonds.
In terms of eﬀects on current welfare, for each unit of additional borrowing the
government increases the transfer to consumers in q+
∂q
∂B0B0 units, these extra resources
allow households to consume more of both goods, thus today’s utility goes up. Next
period, the government would have to repay its debt, which reduces future household
disposable income and consumption. However, it only pays back when it’s optimal,
so households only end up consuming less goods in those states where the government
does not default and taxes households in order to honor its obligations. It is important
to mention that the repayment set z(B0), depends on B0, thus additional borrowingwould enlarge it. In order to analyze the eﬀects of extra borrowing on next period’
utility, tomorrow’s terms of trade realizations can be separated into three sets: ﬁrst,
those states where the government repays its debt, before and after increasing B0.I n
these states additional borrowing would reduce disposable income and consumption,
since the government would have to tax households to pay its debt. Second, those
states where the government defaults, before and after increasing B0. In these states,
households simply consume their income, thus additional borrowing would not have any
eﬀect on welfare. Finally, those states where the government does not default before
increasing B0, but it does after issuing additional bonds. In these states, if households
a r et a x e db e f o r et h ec h a n g ei nB0, then they would not be taxed after the rise in external
borrowing, therefore welfare would be increased in these states.
5. Calibration
5.1. Data
The benchmark model is calibrated to a set of emerging market economies considering
quarterly data for the period 1994-2004. The data is obtained from diﬀerent sources:
terms of trade are constructed from IMF data and output are obtained from IMF.
Spreads correspond to the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) constructed
by J.P.Morgan8. Output and terms of trade are in logs and all series are ﬁltered with the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. The countries that were included in the sample are Argentina,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
Table1 in the appendix shows the terms of trade volatility for each country and the
8Regarding the EMBI spread the sample varies across countries: Argentina 1994:1-2004:4, Colombia
1999:3-2004:4, Ecuador 1995:2-2004:4, Peru 1997:2-2004:4 and Venezuela 1998:1-2004:4cross country correlation. Venezuela stands as the country with highest terms of trade
volatility, mainly due to its extremely high dependency on oil. Argentina, the country
with the highest diversiﬁcation in production (though still highly dependent on speciﬁc
goods like beef and agricultural products), presents the lowest volatility in terms of
trade. The cross country correlation values are all positive and average almost 0.4, with
the largest being 0.85 between Ecuador and Venezuela. Figure 4 illustrates the positive
comovement of the sample series. Table 1 shows the volatility in terms of trade, output
and spreads, and the correlations between output and spreads for the diﬀerent countries.
Table 3 depicts the lagged impact of terms of trade shocks on output for the ﬁve
economies. Lags up to four quarters are considered. While the contemporaneous cor-
relation is generally mild, lagged values of terms of trade present large values for most
countries. The largest values correspond to Ecuador with 0.72 and a four quarters lag,
while Peru is the country where the strongest correlation occurs with one quarter lag,
and a value of 0.59.
5.2. The Benchmark Model
This calibration involved choosing the functional forms and the parameter values. The
parameters are chosen based on existing empirical work on emerging markets, if avail-
able. Otherwise they are set to mimic some empirical regularities of emerging markets.
The period utility function has the GHH (1988) speciﬁcation. This preference spec-
iﬁcation has the property that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and labor is independent of consumption. Therefore, labor supply does not depend
on the level of consumption. The composite consumption good ct is obtained using a
Cobb-Douglas aggregation function on the consumption of importables and exportables,where α represents the share of exportables. This speciﬁcation of preferences generates
the following optimal decisions:
















a standard technology in dynamic general equilibrium models where 1 − θ corresponds
to the intermediate good share. Thus, input demands follow from ﬁrst order conditions







Some of the parameter values that are used are standard for business cycles models
in emerging markets. The parameter σ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion, is set
equal to 2, a standard value. The parameter Ψ is set to 0.455 following Mendoza (1991).
This parameter determines the labour supply elasticity, which equals 1
Ψ.
The discount factor is set at 0.85 and helps to match the maximum risk free debt/GDP
limit of 16%. According to Reinhart, Rogoﬀ and Savasano (2003) safe external debt
to GDP thresholds for emerging economies appear to be as low as 15 to 20 percent of
GDP.The share of exportables α is set to 0.85 which implies that consumption of ﬁnal
imported goods represents 15% of total expenditures on consumption goods. This value
is taken from data of the Ecuador economy for the period under study, where the
fraction of ﬁnal imported goods in total household consumption ﬂuctuated between
13 % and 16 %. The parameter µ reﬂects the exogenous probability of reentering
international capital markets after default and it is set equal to 0.1. This value implies
that a defaulting country will return to ﬁnancial markets in about 10 quarters after
defaulting on its foreign debt. This is in line with the exclusion period observed in the
data by Gelos (2003), who calculated the average number of years that a country was
excluded from international ﬁnancial markets to be close to 3 years for countries that
defaulted on their foreign debt during the period 1980 - 1999.
The parameter A governs the output loss in autarky and is set equal to 0.98 following
empirical studies. Puhan and Sturzenegger (2003) estimate an average fall in output of
2% per year after a default for the default cases of 1980’s. The foreign input share 1−θ
is set to 0.39 which is value used by Kose (2002). He ﬁnds an average value of 0.39 for
this parameter using data for 28 developing countries. Shocks to terms of trade follow
a ﬁrst order autoregressive processes such that if pt =l o gPt then





t+1 is an IID standard normal shock. Emerging markets data is used in order
to estimate the autoregressive process for the terms of trade shock. Once we have the
parameters for the terms of trade shocks, we approximate them with a discrete ﬁrst
order Markov chain using Hussey and Tauchen’s (1991) procedure. The parameters for
the benchmark model are shown in Table 4.5.3. Results
This section shows the main results of the paper, and analyzes the statistical properties
of the model economy when it is subject to terms of trade shocks.
The business cycles moments for the benchmark calibration of the model are pre-
sented in Table 5. Business cycles statistics are average values over 100 simulations of
100 realizations each. The simulated data is log and ﬁltered equally as the empirical
data. Mean output is normalized to one. The model can match several features of
emerging markets economies.
The correlation of output with spreads is consistent with the emerging markets
data, though the magnitude is lower. The result that output is negatively correlated
with spreads is due to the asset structure of the model. Asset markets are incomplete
because there is only one asset available, a one period non-contingent bond. Given this
market structure, default is tempting in times when output and consumption are low
since a given debt-service payment reduces utility more strongly in those states. Since
repayment of non-contingent loans are more costly in bad states of nature, incentives to
default tend to be stronger in times of low output. Risk neutral creditors are willing to
supply loans that in bad states of the world will result in default by charging a higher
risk premium. In this way, the model can generate counter-cyclical interest rate spreads.
Figure 6 plots the discount bond price schedule as a function of assets for the highest
and lowest values of terms of trade. As the ﬁgure shows, bond prices are an increasing
function of foreign assets. For small levels of foreign debt, the government always pays
back its debt, so it borrows from international markets at the world risk free interest
rate. In this range of debt, bond price is simply the inverse of the gross risk free rate.
For values of foreign debt up to 16.07 % of mean output, the government does not haveany incentive to default so it still faces risk free interest rates. However, as foreign debt
goes up, at a certain debt/GDP level bond prices start to decrease. This threshold level
is increasing in the magnitude of the shock. The higher the levels of foreign debt the
lower the bond prices because the incentives to default are stronger for large indebted
governments. At debt levels above 20.29 % of mean output the government always
defaults regardless of the terms of trade realization. At that point bond prices are zero
since the probability of default is one.
For each of the terms of trade values, there is a range of borrowing levels for which
default is a possible outcome, for these assets positions the bond price is between the
inverse of the risk free rate and zero. For a given value of assets, the higher the terms
of trade the higher the bond price. This implies that incentives to default are stronger
when the economy suﬀers an adverse terms of trade shock. Therefore, the model predicts
that default is more likely in bad times.
Figure 7 shows the default region for the calibrated economy, i.e., the combinations
of terms of trade levels and foreign debt levels for which default is optimal. Given a
terms of trade shock, if default is optimal for a certain debt level, it will be optimal for
all higher levels of foreign debt.
Although default occurs in equilibrium, it is not a frequent event as it occurs on
average only 32 times in 10,000 periods, implying that the country defaults every 78
years. This result is closely linked to the shape of the bond price schedule. As ﬁgure 6
shows, the schedule is extremely steep over the range of foreign debt levels that carry a
positive and ﬁnite risk premia. Suppose that the current level of terms of trade is low,
then this adverse shock lowers domestic output through its eﬀects on imported inputs
and reduces consumption possibilities since the purchasing power of household income islower. Under this circumstances, the government would try to borrow from international
markets in order to smooth private agents’ consumption. As the government borrows,
the bond price starts to decline, and at a certain debt level it decreases very sharply.
At that point if the government wants to borrow any additional amount, it would have
to pay a much higher interest rate, that is, the marginal cost of borrowing increases
sharply. The government takes into account the eﬀect of additional borrowing on the
interest rate it has to pay and therefore decides not to go too far smoothing households
consumption.
The soon and sudden interest rate increase means that bonds are not good instru-
ments for insurance and consumption smoothing purposes anymore. So the government
borrows from capital markets paying either low risk premia or not premia at all. Since
low levels of risk premia are related to very low probabilities of default, it happens that
default is a rare event. This feature also explains the high volatility of consumption
obtained in the model: the ratio of σc
σGDP ≈ 0.98 obtained in the simulation is clear
evidence that the bonds are not good instruments for consumption smoothing.
Spread volatility is lower than the one observed in the data for Ecuador. The
standard deviation of spreads obtained in the benchmark model is 0.69. The lack of
spread volatility in the model derives from the fact that default is not a frequent event.
The simulated sequence plotted in Figure 8 shows how the interest rate spread in-
creases as terms of trade deteriorate in the economy: from periods two to ﬁve the
persistent deterioration in terms of trade leads to an increase of more than two per-
centage points in country spread, though on the next period the terms of trade recovers
and the spread declines. However, the deeper fall in the terms of trade from periods 10
to 16 ends in increasing spreads and optimal default of the economy. As can be seen,terms of trade and interest rate spreads are negatively correlated and default occurs in
bad times, as observed in data.
5.4. Sensitivity Analysis
This section studies how changes in the technological characteristics and in household’s
consumption basket in the benchmark model aﬀect interest rate spreads, debt limits
and default rates in the small open economy. As the participation of importables in
household’s consumption basket becomes more important, equilibrium spreads and de-
fault rates are higher and the range of debt for which there is a positive and ﬁnite risk
premium becomes broader. The economy starts paying a premium at lower debt level
but the debt limit for the economy increases. A similar eﬀect is observed when the share
of foreign inputs in output increases.
Table 6 reports the results of the sensitivity analysis, diﬀerent values for the foreign
input share and the domestic good share were considered.
As Table 6 shows, a change in the factor share of the foreign input aﬀects equilibrium
spreads and debt sustainability levels for a given terms of trade shock. The larger the
share of foreign inputs in production, the more volatile the domestic output. Consider
a deterioration in terms of trade, ﬁrms would try to produce less exportable goods, in
order to do that they would hire less labor services and purchase less foreign inputs,
these would reduce wage rates without aﬀecting prices of foreign inputs. A lower wage
rate would moderate the output fall, nevertheless this eﬀect is less important the lower
the share of labor in production. Thus for any given adverse terms of trade shock, a
larger share of Z in output implies a deeper recession that would make households worse
oﬀ, requiring larger government borrowing to smooth consumption.There are two eﬀects on the incentives to default: ﬁrst, a larger share of foreign
inputs implies a more volatile output, so in the absence of borrowing or lending the
ﬂuctuations in household consumption will be larger and because of that, having access
to international credit markets will be more valuable. Because the value of participation
is higher, the economy might tend to borrow more without having incentives to default.
Second, under adverse shocks, recessions are more severe the larger the weight of foreign
inputs, so repayment of non-contingent debt is more costly in those states, tending to
increase default probabilities and interest rate spreads, i.e., the incentives for the small
open economy to default start at lower debt levels.
Figure 9 illustrates that the risk free debt limit is lower, reﬂe c t i n gt h ef a c tt h a t
the second eﬀect dominates in the model economy. In this way, a higher share of
foreign inputs and a more volatile output would imply higher country spreads and lower
sustainable debt levels. These results are consistent with data and empirical studies:
Catao and Sutton (2002) who ﬁnd that countries that experience higher terms of trade
and GDP volatility encounter higher probabilities of default. Gelos and Shahay (2003)
ﬁnd that countries with higher terms of trade and output volatility have less access to
international credit markets.
As output and overall consumption becomes more volatile, the shock is more im-
portant for this economy relative to the amount of debt, so the bond price schedule is
less steep. It follows that the default region for this economy now becomes broader,
as the ﬁgure shows. As mentioned before, for a given terms of trade shock, domestic
output is more volatile the larger the share of foreign inputs. Thus a small share of Z
implies small diﬀerences among output and consumption in good times and output and
consumption in bad times. Since the diﬀerence in utility between a high shock and a lowshock will be smaller for any given level of foreign debt, the amount of debt becomes a
more important factor for the default decision, implying a steeper bond price schedule.
Conversely, a higher participation of foreign inputs in production leads to a stronger
relative eﬀect of terms of trade shocks compared to debt, and therefore a ﬂatter bond
schedule and broader region with positive and ﬁnite risk premia.
It can also be observed from Table 6 that a given worsening in the terms of trade
should induce a larger decline in welfare and larger spreads, the larger the share of im-
portables in household consumption preferences. An adverse terms of trade shock has
two eﬀects: ﬁrst, a higher price of imported inputs implies a lower output and lower
labor income for households. In second place, the purchasing power of exportable goods
produced by the country will be lower, so the value of labor income in terms of importa-
bles also decreases and the original set of consumption bundles is now unavailable to the
representative household. Therefore, the higher the weight of importables in households’
preferences, the more severe will be the latter eﬀect since the good to which households
are giving increasing value in its utility function becomes more expensive. Hence, for a
given terms of trade shock and output loss, the negative eﬀects on households’ welfare
will be stronger. As with the share of foreign inputs in output, a larger participation of
importables in consumption makes participation in credit markets more valuable and
thus more borrowing tends to be supported without having incentives to default. How-
ever, as mentioned before, an adverse terms of trade shock reduces both output and the
purchasing power of each unit of domestic good. As the share of importables increases
the second eﬀect becomes more important, so that any given terms of trade shock has
a stronger eﬀect on household welfare. This implies that repayment in those states is
more costly, thus default incentives tend to rise, the sustainable amount of debt re-duces and default probabilities and spreads increase. As in the case of foreign inputs
in production, simulation results show that the latter mechanism clearly dominates in
the calibrated economy. Therefore, the overall eﬀect of a higher share of importables is
an increase in country spreads and a decrease in the sustainable debt level for a given
output and labour income levels and volatility.
6. Conclusions
The paper analyzes the importance of terms of trade ﬂuctuations on country spreads and
default incentives in emerging markets by considering a stochastic general equilibrium
model of a small open economy where default is an equilibrium outcome. Default
probabilities are endogenous to the economy’s incentives to default and they aﬀect the
equilibrium interest rates faced by the economy. Markets are incomplete, which generate
counter-cyclical default risk since it is more costly to repay non-contingent loans in times
when terms of trade are low and therefore output and consumption are low, than in
booms.
In times where the government is highly indebted, a negative terms of trade shock
may induce the government to default on its sovereign debt. A deterioration of terms
of trade can trigger an economic contraction in the form of a decrease in the real value
of output and therefore a decline in consumption. This can induce a highly indebted
government to optimally decide not to raise taxes to repay the debt, which would exac-
erbate households’ fall in consumption, but to default instead on its sovereign debt in
order to avoid such decline in consumption. Through these shocks, the model generates
counter-cyclical interest rate spreads, explains a signiﬁcant portion of the spread level
and volatility and mimics the correlations of GDP with spreads to a signiﬁcant extentin the quantitative analysis.
The model also analyzes how would changes in the production structure of these
economies impact on the countries’ spreads. The production technology in the paper
allows one to explore the eﬀects of input shares on incentives to default and therefore
on country spreads in these economies. In particular, it is observed that a higher
dependence of the productive sector on foreign inputs may lead to higher country interest
rate spreads and lower equilibrium debt levels. Similarly, when analyzing the eﬀects of
changes in the consumption structure between importables and exportables, the model
predicts that for any given production structure, the higher the weight of imported
goods in the household consumption basket, the higher and more volatile will be the
spreads and the tighter the sustainable debt level. The larger the share of importables
in consumption that households want to hold, the more severe is the fall in their overall
consumption, since it has become more expensive and their income declined. In the
same way, the larger the foreign input share in production, the worse the recession for a
given adverse terms of trade realization, so repayment is more costly, providing higher
incentives to default. Foreign creditors perceive this increased riskiness of the economy,
thus lending at higher interest rates in equilibrium and reducing the amount of lending
to the small economy for any given interest rate spread: higher interest rate spreads
and lower debt levels are observed in equilibrium.
In light of the above results, it is possible to derive some interesting policy lessons:
given the strong eﬀects of terms of trade shocks on government incentives to default and
thus on interest rate spreads, it seems important for many developing countries that
governments provide incentives to the private sector to diversify the export structure
and provide ﬁnancial instruments for the private sector to smooth price ﬂuctuations.The latter might include the development of credit markets for commodity price indexed
bonds, which would ensure, as eﬃciency dictates, that countries pay more in good states
than in bad ones.
7. Appendix
7.1. Algorithm
From the optimal labor decision of the household and the ﬁrst order conditions of the
ﬁrm, the household labor income, wl, is calculated for each possible realization of the
shocks. Given the equilibrium in the labor market, the expression for the labor supply
is substituted in the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm problem. In order to solve for Z, l
and w for each of the states of the economy, the following system of nonlinear equations
is solved:
Pθ(L)
θ−1 Z1−θ = w
P(1 − θ)(L)
θ Z−θ =1




Once the above system is solved for all possible values of the shocks, the following
algorithm is used:
1. Assume an initial function for the price of the bond q0(B0,P). To calculate the
initial value of the bond, use the inverse of the risk free rate.
2. Use q0 and the initial values of V0 and V d ( eg. start with 0 matrices) to iterate
on the Bellman equations and solve for the value functions and the policy functions.3. Given the initial price of the bond q0, calculate the default function D0(B,P),










where i represents the number of iterations and   is a small number.
7.2. Propositions
Proposition 1 For any given realization of the exogenous shock P, default incentives
are stronger the higher the level of foreign debt B.
Proof. For each realization of P, default incentives are stronger the lower the value
of foreign assets. This is derived from the fact that V c, the value of staying in good
credit, is strictly increasing in foreign assets, while V d, the value of defaulting, does
not depend on the level of assets. Therefore, there is a unique value for assets B∗(P)
where V c = V d, such that given P the government always pays back if foreign assets
are higher than B∗(P) and defaults otherwise.
Thus, the only proof that is needed is that V c is strictly increasing in foreign assets,
∂V c


























Given the GHH speciﬁcation for household utility, labor supply does not depend on




∂T =0 . In addition, the transferthat households receive from the government, T = B − q(B0,s)B0 is increasing in the















Households’ disposable income y = wl + T is increasing in the transfer,
∂y
∂T =1 .
Then, an increase in B induces a rise in T and therefore in y, and since both x and m
are normal goods, ∂x
∂T > 0 and ∂m
∂T > 0. Therefore, ∂V c
∂B > 0.
Proposition 2 For any given B, a lower realization of terms of trade P reduces
household consumption C(P,T) (and welfare) if there is no government intervention in
asset markets, T =0:I fP1 <P 2 then u(C(P1,0)) <u (C(P2,0)).
Consider a decline in P.I tm u s tb ep r o v e dt h a t
dC(P,0)
dP > 0.
In order to prove Proposition 2, Lemma 2.1 is proved.







Proof. Given a GHH speciﬁcation for households’ preferences, labor decisions do
not depend on the level of foreign assets. Therefore, equilibrium wages and inputs only
depend on terms of trade: w(P),L(P),Z(P).
Combining the optimal labor choice for the households l =[ αα(1 − α)1−α w
Pα] and
the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrms P
∂F(L,Z)
∂L = w, P
∂F(L,Z)










in two unknowns L and Z, where G(L)= LΨ
αα(1−α)1−α. Note that
∂G(L)
∂L > 0 since Ψ > 0.
These two equations can be rewritten as:.H1(L(P),Z(P),P)=0 ,
H2(L(P),Z(P),P)=0 .









































































































































































∂L2 − Pα−1 ∂G(L)










Therefore, given the equilibrium wage w = PαG(L) and
∂G(L)








+ αG(L)Pα−1 > 0.
These results are now used to prove Proposition 2,
dC(P,0)
dP > 0.








M(P,0) = (1 − α)w(P)L(P),







































and after substituting for X,M and L:
dC(P,0)
dP



































= αα(1 − α)(1−α)[
ZγL1−γ
Pα − αwL]






Pα [1 − αγ]F(L,Z) > 0.
Proposition 3 For any given level of foreign debt, default incentives are stronger
the lower the terms of trade. For all P1 <P 2, if P2 ∈ z(B) then P1 ∈ z(B).
In order to prove Proposition 3, we prove Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1 If for some B the default set is not empty z(B) 6=0 , then there are no
ﬁnancial contracts available for the government {q(B0),B0} such that the government
could choose a positive transfer to the household T = B − q(B0)B0 > 0.
Proof. This can be proven by contradiction. Suppose there are contracts available
to the government such that B − q(B0)B0 > 0 but the government chooses B∗ and
T∗ = B − q(B∗)B∗ < 0 to maximize V c (B,P). Suppose as well that the government
ﬁnds default to be optimal because V d (P) >Vc (B,P). Then,
V d (P)=u(C (P,0)) + βEV d ¡
P0¢
,




V d (P) >V c (B,P),
u(C (P,0)) + βEV d ¡
P0¢















M (P,T)=( 1 − α)[w(P)L(P)+T],
L(P)=
∙






Note that without output loss in autarky Cd (P)=C (P,0) since w(P)=wd (P) and
L(P)=Ld (P).N o t et h a ti ft h e r ea r eﬁnancial contracts {q(B0),B0} available to the
government such that B − q(B0)B0 > 0 then default can not be the optimal decision,
because it is possible for the government to choose a contract that implies a posi-
tive transfer T>0 such that V c (B,P) >V d (P),s i n c eEV0 (B0,P) > EV d (P0) and
u(C (P,T)) >u(C (P,0)).T h eﬁrst expression comes from the fact that V0 (B0,P0)=
max
©
V c (B0,P0),Vd (P0)
ª
and the second expression holdsb e c a u s et h et r a n s f e ri sp o s -
























=( 1 − α) > 0.
Thus, B∗ can not be the level of foreign assets that maximizes V c (B,P) and then ﬁnd
default to be optimal. There are contracts available to the government such that the
value of staying in the contract is higher than the value of defaulting and going to
autarky. Thus , if z(B) 6=0 , then ∃ some P, such that V d (P) >Vc (B,P) therefore if
B0 is chosen to maximize V c (B,P) and default is the optimal decision, it must be the
case that there are no ﬁnancial contracts {q(B0),B0} that allowed the government togive a positive transfer to the household, thus T = B − q(B0)B0 < 0 for all ﬁnancial
contracts {q(B0),B0}.
Now, we can prove Proposition 3, which says that for all P1 <P 2, if P2 ∈ z(B)
then P1 ∈ z(B).N o wi f P2 ∈ z(B) then V d (P2) >Vc (B,P2).
u(C (P2,0)) + βEV d ¡
P0¢




{T2,B 2} ∈ argmaxV c (B,P2),
T2 < 0.
The transfer T2 is negative by Lemma 3.1. If the following inequality 7.1 holds, then
P2 ∈ z(B) implies P1 ∈ z(B).
Vc (B,P2) − Vc (B,P1) >Vd (P2) − V d (P1). (7.1)
Where















u(C (P1,0)) + βEV d ¡
P0¢o
.
Condition 7.1 implies that given foreign assets, default is also optimal when terms of
trade are lower than P2.
V d (P1) − Vc (B,P1) >Vd (P2) − Vc (B,P2) > 0.In order to prove Proposition 3 we prove that condition 7.1 holds. Given that terms of
trade shock are i.i.d. the right hand side of 7.2 simpliﬁes into:
V d (P2) − V d (P1)=u(C (P2,0)) − u(C (P1,0)).
Given B and P2, {T2,B 2} are the optimal decisions for transfer and foreign assets, so
it must be the case that:
u(C (P2,T 2)) + βEV0
¡
B2,P0¢




If the following condition 7.3 holds then 7.1 holds by transitivity










We can simplify 7.3 to get 7.4:
u(C (P2,T 1)) − u(C (P1,T 1)) >u(C (P2,0)) − u(C (P1,0)). (7.4)
Since u(C) is increasing in C and concave, 7.4 holds if the following condition is satisﬁed:
C (P2,T 1) − C (P1,T 1) > C (P2,0) − C (P1,0). (7.5)
Given
dC(P,T)
dT > 0, 7.5 holds for T1 < 0.
C (P2,T 1) − C (P1,T 1)=X (P2,T 1)
α M (P2,T 1)
1−α − X (P1,T 1)
α M (P1,T 1)
1−α ,
C (P2,0) − C (P1,0) = X (P2,0)
α M (P2,0)
1−α − X (P1,0)
α M (P1,0)
1−α .
After some algebra and substituting the equilibrium expressions for X and M, the
following result is obtained























.Thus, since P1 <P 2, 7.1 holds if T1 < 0.












Therefore, 7.1 holds which implies that P1 ∈ z(B).
Proposition 4 Asset decisions are increasing in terms of trade. The government
borrows more in recessions than in booms. Given a current level of foreign assets B and
conditional on not defaulting, for all P1 <P 2, if B0
1 = B0 (B,P1) and B0




Proof. This proposition can be proven by contradiction. Suppose that P1 <P 2 and
B0
1 > B0
2. The government, conditional on not defaulting, borrows more in good times
than in bad times.
{T1,B 1} ∈ argmaxV c (B,P1),
{T2,B 2} ∈ argmaxV c (B,P2).
From utility maximization:




















2.t h e nEV0 (B0














and the value of no defaulting is strictly increasing in foreign assets. In addition, If
EV0 (B0
1,P0) > EV0 (B0
2,P0) then expression 7.7 implies that C (P2,T 2) > C (P2,T 1).
Since C (P,T) is increasing in the transfer, T2 would be higher than T1.












1 = T1.Adding expressions 7.6 and 7.7, the following is derived:
u(C (P2,T 2)) + u(C (P1,T 1)) > u(C (P2,T 1)) + u(C (P1,T 2)),
u(C (P2,T 2)) − u(C (P2,T 1)) > u(C (P1,T 2)) − u(C (P1,T 1)).
Since
∂C(P,T)
∂P > 0 by Proposition 2, and utility is concave and increasing in C (P,T),
the last expression does not hold if
C (P2,T 2) − C (P2,T 1) 6 C (P1,T 2) − C (P1,T 1). (7.8)
In order to prove Proposition 4 it is suﬃcient to prove that the above equation 7.8 holds
for all P1 <P 2 and T1 ≤ T2.
C (P2,T 2) − C (P2,T 1)=X (P2,T 2)
α M (P2,T 2)
1−α − X (P2,T 1)
α M (P2,T 1)
1−α ,
C (P1,T 2) − C (P1,T 1)=X (P1,T 2)
α M (P1,T 2)
1−α − X (P1,T 1)
α M (P1,T 1)
1−α .
After some algebra and substituting the equilibrium expressions for X and M, the
following result is obtained










Thus, since P1 <P 2, expression 7.8 holds if T1 ≤ T2.











[T2 − T1] ≤ 0.
Therefore, condition 7.8 holds which implies that B0
1 6 B0
2.
Proposition 5 Interest rates cannot be procyclical. Given the level of foreign assets
B ,f o ra l lP1 <P 2, if B0
1 = B0 (B,P1) and B0
2 = B0 (B,P2) then q(B0
1) 6 q(B0
2).Proof. This proposition can be proven by contradiction. Suppose that P1 <P 2 and
q(B0
1) >q(B0
2). Since shocks are assumed to be i.i.d., the bond price schedule does not
depend on the current level of terms of trade. According to Lemma 2.1 GDP (P1) <
GDP (P2) since both inputs are increasing in terms of trade. Thus, bond prices would
be lower in booms, which means that interests rates, which are equal to the inverse of
bond prices, are procyclical. Since bond prices are decreasing in default probabilities, a







































which means that the previous expression can not hold, thus interest rates can not be
procyclical.7.3. Tables and Figures
Table 1 Terms of Trade, 1994.1 - 2004.4
Std Dev Correlations
Argentina Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
Argentina 4.22 0.18 0.55 0.47 0.39
Colombia 6.35 0.18 0.38 0.39 0.16
Ecuador 11.27 0.55 0.38 0.31 0.85
Peru 8.70 0.47 0.39 0.31 0.21
Venezuela 24.93 0.39 0.16 0.85 0.21
Table 2 Emerging Economies Data, 1994.1 - 2004.4
Std Dev(TOT) Std Dev(GDP) Std Dev(Spread) Corr(GDP-Spread)
Argentina 4.22 4.98 10.17 -0.65
Colombia 6.35 2.05 1.15 0.02
Ecuador 11.27 3.01 6.92 -0.70
Peru 8.70 2.32 1.06 -0.47
Venezuela 24.93 6.22 2.45 -0.55T a b l e3C r o s sC o r r e l a t i ons, 1994.1 - 2004.4
Correlation of GDP(t) with
TOT(t) TOT(t-1) TOT(t-2) TOT(t-3) TOT(t-4)
Argentina 0.20 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.20
Colombia 0.17 0.30 0.33 0.25 0.11
Ecuador -0.27 -0.06 0.23 0.51 0.72
Peru 0.53 0.59 0.40 0.18 0.01
Venezuela 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.47 0.55
Table 4 Benchmark Parameter Values
Discount Factor β 0.85
Risk Aversion σ 2
Domestic Good Share α 0.85
Elasticity of Labor Supply 1
Ψ 2.22
Re-entry Probability µ 0.1
Foreign Input Share 1 − θ 0.39
Terms of Trade σεp 0.079
ρp 0.68
U.S. Real Interest Rate rf 0.01
Factor Productivity in Autarky A 0.98Table 5 Simulation Results
Std Dev Correlation with GDP Correlation with Spread
GDP 5.10 -0.38
Consumption 4.98 0.98 -0.36
Terms of Trade 10.89 1 -0.38
Spread 0.69 -0.38
Default Rate 0.0032
Risk Free debt Limit 16.07
Maximum Spread 2.25
Table 6 Sensitivity Analysis
Std Dev Maximum Correlation Default Risk Free
Spread Spread (GDP-Spread) Rate Debt Limit
Input Share (Production)
0.2 0.31 0.99 -0.25 0.0010 0.2014
0.39 0.69 2.25 -0.38 0.0032 0.1607
0.5 0.98 5.94 -0.42 0.0047 0.1222
Domestic Good (Utility)
Share
0.95 0.52 1.47 -0.27 0.0019 0.1703
0.85 0.69 2.25 -0.38 0.0032 0.1607
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Figure 6. Bond Price
Low TOT












Figure 7. Default Region
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Figure 9. Bond Price and Input Share
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